译者 | 吴琦好 中国人民大学法律硕士
一审 | 王槐语 上海交通大学
二审 | 陈飞越 爱丁堡大学LLM
编辑 | 罗彤 西北政法大学
王冰子 烟台大学
责编｜扎恩哈尔·阿黑哈提 新疆农业大学
从Rachel Stone v. ALS上诉案看董事会决议的有效性
引言
1975年的Rachel Stone v. American Lacquer Solvents Co.（以下简称 “ALS公司” ）[1]宾夕法尼亚州最高法院认为，如果董事会会议没有通知所有董事参加，又没有出现追认、弃权等情形，则公司作出的决议无效。
一、案情概述
上诉人雷切尔·斯通（Rachel Stone）是被告ALS公司董事长哈罗德·斯通（Harold Stone）的妻子。1967 年12月7日，考虑到哈罗德为公司提供的服务，ALS 公司的董事会通过决议，规定如果哈罗德先于雷切尔去世，ALS 公司每年将向雷切尔支付 8000 美元的养老金，直至她去世或再婚。该决议还规定，未经哈罗德同意，不得撤销该决议。
1968年3月2日，哈罗德与雷切尔的婚姻出现纠纷。此后，哈罗德写信给ALS公司的总裁兼总经理罗伯特·肖（Robert Shaw)，希望取消为妻子提供养老金的决议。罗伯特联系了公司的法律顾问，并根据其建议准备了一封哈罗德写给ALS公司董事会的信件，信件中表示哈罗德希望撤销1967年12月7日的决议。
1968年3月11日，罗伯特主持召开了ALS董事会特别会议。7名董事会成员中，共有5名出席了会议，并一致同意撤销1967年12月7日的决议。哈罗德本人没有收到召开会议的通知，因此没有出席会议。
1968 年11月1日哈罗德去世。ALS公司拒绝向雷切尔支付1967年12月7日决议中规定的养老金。原告雷切尔向法院提起诉讼，请求判决公司实际履行（Specific Performance）决议。初审法院判决认为，由于规定支付养老金的决议已于1968年3月11日的会议上被董事会有效撤销，原告的诉讼请求应予驳回。原告不服，遂提起上诉。
二、争议焦点
1968年3月11日就撤销雷切尔养老金一事召开的董事会特别会议所作之决议是否合法有效？
三、裁判要旨
宾夕法尼亚州最高法院认为此次董事会会议因没有通知所有董事参加，又没有出现弃权、追认、禁止反言等情形，因此所作决议无效，撤销原判，发回重审。
四、主要法律依据
Eagen, Justice
伊根大法官：
As a general rule the directors of a corporation may bind a corporation only when they act at a legal meeting of the board. If they purport to act at a meeting which is not a legal meeting, their action is not that of the corporation, and the corporation, absent ratification or acquiescence, is not bound.
一般而言，公司董事只有通过在合法的董事会会议上采取行动，其行为才能对公司产生约束力。如果他们意图在一个不合法的会议上采取行动，其行为并不会转变成公司的行为，且公司在没有追认或默许的情况下不受该行为约束。
As to special meetings of the board of directors of a corporation, the general rule in Pennsylvania is that such a meeting held without notice to some or any of the directors and in their absence is illegal, and action taken at such a meeting, although by a majority of the directors, is invalid absent ratification or estoppel. However, this notice requirement may be waived by a director either prior or subsequent to the special meeting, provided such waiver is in writing. Additionally, any action which may properly be taken at a meeting of a board of directors of a corporation may be effected and is binding without a meeting, if a consent in writing setting forth the action so taken is signed by each and every member of the board and filed with the secretary of the corporation.
关于公司董事会的特别会议，宾夕法尼亚州的一般规则是，在未通知部分或任何董事、且该等董事缺席的情况下所召开的公司董事会议是非法的。此类会议上所作出的行为，虽然经多数董事同意，然而在没有追认或适用禁止反言的情况下也是无效的。但是，董事可以在特别会议开始之前或结束之后以书面形式对前述通知权利表示放弃。此外，任何可在公司董事会会议上讨论的事项，如经董事会每位成员书面签字同意并提交公司秘书存档，无需召开会议即可生效并具有约束力。
（图片来源于网络）
A reading of the trial court’s opinion filed in support of its decree upholding the legality of the Board’s action of March 11, 1968, rescinding the Board’s prior Resolution providing for the payment of the pension to the plaintiff was based on three grounds, any one of which, if correct, would warrant its ruling.
原审法院基于三个理由认为董事会1968 年 3 月11日的行动合法，并撤销了董事会之前规定向原告支付养老金的决议。只要其中任何一个理由成立，都将证明其裁决是正确的。
First, the court concluded that Stone’s letter of March 3, 1968, constituted a consent to the Board’s subsequent action rescinding the pension Resolution. The difficulty with this position is that the applicable statute requires that such a consent be executed after the meeting and that it specifically set forth the action taken, and that it be filed with the secretary of the corporation. Stone’s letter does not meet these requirements.
第一，原审法院认为哈罗德1968年3月3日的信件构成了对董事会随后撤销养老金决议的同意。这一理由的问题在于，适用法要求这种同意必须在会议之后作出，且必须具体说明会议中所作出的行为，并提交给公司秘书。哈罗德的信件并不符合这些要求。
Secondly, the court concluded Stone’s letter of March 3, 1968, constituted a waiver of receipt of notice of the meeting of March 11, 1968. The difficulty with this position is that the letter does not refer to the meeting or indicate in any way that notice thereof is waived. The letter amounts to no more than an expression of desire or consent to rescind the pension Resolution. In connection with its conclusion that Stone’s letter constituted a waiver of notice of the meeting, the court reasoned that no purpose would be served by Stone’s presence at the meeting since the other Directors were merely acceding to Stone’s wishes and request. This analysis overlooks the rationale for the salutory rule that all directors receive notice of special meetings. That rationale is that ‘each member of a corporate body has the right of consultation with the others, and has the right to be heard upon all questions considered, and it is presumed that if the absent members had been present they might have dissented, and their arguments might have convinced the majority of the unwisdom of their proposed action and thus have produced a different result.’
第二，原审法院认为哈罗德1968年3月3日的信件构成对1968年3月11日会议通知的弃权。但是，这种观点的问题在于该信中并没有提及董事会议，哈罗德也没有以任何方式表明放弃受通知的权利。这封信仅表达了哈罗德对撤销养老金决议的愿望或同意。关于哈罗德的信件构成放弃会议通知的结论，原审法院认为哈罗德的出席没有意义，因为其他董事只是在满足哈罗德的意愿和要求。这种分析忽略了“所有董事都应收到特别会议通知”这一法定规则的基本原理。这一原理是，“公司的每个成员都有权与其他成员协商，并就审议的所有问题发表意见。可以推定，如果缺席的成员出席了会议，该等成员可能会提出异议，说服大多数人他们的提议是不明智的，从而产生不同的结果。”
We agree with this rationale and, in view of the presumption embodied therein, we cannot concur in the trial court’s premise that Stone and the other Directors were of one mind as regards the pension rescission. In relation to this, we specifically note that another member of the Board of Directors failed to attend the meeting of March 11, 1968, and there is nothing in the record to show if he received notice of the meeting, or ever consented to the action taken at the meeting.
我们同意这一基本原理，鉴于其中所包含的推定，我们无法支持原审法院关于哈罗德和其他董事在取消养老金问题上意见一致的前提。对此，我们注意到，董事会的另一名成员也没有出席1968年3月11日的会议，而且记录中也没有任何证据表明他收到了会议通知，或同意会议决定。
（图片来源于网络）
Finally, the court concluded that the rescinding resolution of the Board was voidable only and that Stone’s silence and failure to object thereto prior to his death amounted to a ratification. The difficulty with this position is that there is nothing in the record to show that Stone was ever made aware that the meeting of March 11, 1968, had been held or knew the rescinding resolution had been adopted by the Board. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said a ratification was effected.
最后，原审法院得出结论认为，该董事会的撤销养老金决议之效力为可撤销，而哈罗德生前保持沉默和没有提出反对意见，即相当于追认。这一结论的问题在于，记录中没有任何证据表明哈罗德知道1968年3月11日的会议已经召开，也没有证据证明其知道董事会已经通过了撤销决议。在这种情况下，不能认为追认已经生效。
Pomeroy, Justice (concurring).
庞贝罗伊大法官附议意见：
The sparsely developed record before us fails to establish that decedent Stone had the requisite notice of the special board meeting of the board of directors here challenged, or that he received knowledge of the rescission of the pension arrangement for his wife which was approved at that meeting. Hence, I am constrained to concur in the Court’s conclusion that the meeting was not lawfully convened and that there is no evidence of a subsequent ratification by Stone of the action taken at the meeting. I further agree that Stone’s letter requesting the rescission was not a consent to board action within the meaning of Section 1402(7) of the Business Corporation Law. Unlike the majority, however, I do not believe that the statute’s application turns on the fact that the letter was signed prior to the special meeting. The purpose of Section 1402(7), as its language makes clear, is to permit a board of directors to act without the necessity of any meeting when all directors consent in writing to such action. Here, there has been no written consent signed by all the directors. It is this factor, not the timing of the execution of the writing, which takes the letter outside the scope of the statute. Accordingly, I concur in the result.
本案中我们所掌握的记录很少，无法证明哈罗德生前收到了董事会特别会议的必要通知，也无法证明其知道在此次会议上批准了取消其妻子养老金的安排。因此，我同意法院的结论，即该会议不是合法召开的，也没有证据表明哈罗德随后追认了在该会议上采取的行动。哈罗德先前要求撤销养老金的信件不是《商业公司法》第1402（7）条所指的对董事会行动的同意。但是，与多数意见不同，我并不认为该法规的适用取决于信件于特别会议前签署这一事实。第1402（7）条的目的，正如其文义所述，系允许董事会在所有董事书面同意的情况下无需召开任何会议即可采取行动。在本案中，并没有所有董事签署的书面同意。正是这一因素，而非签署书面同意的时间，使这封信超出了法规范围。因此，我同意董事会并非合法召开的结论。
五、评论
Rachel Stone v. American Lacquer Solvents Co.案涉及ALS公司的一次特别董事会会议决议的效力。在判决书中，宾夕法尼亚州最高法院伊根大法官的说理揭示了该州公司法对董事会特别会议程序上的严格规定和要求。公司召开董事会特别会议必须通知全体董事参加，即使出席和同意的董事已经构成多数，如果未通知所有董事导致部分董事未能出席，其所做出的决议也将失效。尽管公司可能认为缺席董事是否被通知并投反对票不会影响决议通过的结果，但是法院认为缺席董事的出席可能会影响其他董事的态度，从而改变多数和少数的比例。通知全体董事的责任在于召集董事会会议的一方。尽管本次会议是执行哈罗德先生的意愿，但没有经过正当程序，该会议被认定为非法，会议中达成的决议也被判定为无效。
脚注
[1] 薄守省主编：《美国公司法判例译评》，对外经济贸易大学出版社2007年版，第21页。
原文链接：
Rachel Stone v. American Lacquer Solvents Co. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 345 A. 2d 174 (1975)
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I323cb290343511d98b61a35269fc5f88/View/FullText.html?transitionType=UniqueDocItem&contextData=(sc.Default)&userEnteredCitation=345+A.2d+174
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